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Abstract—Communication network failures that are caused by
disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes and cyber-attacks,
can have significant economic and societal impact. To address
this problem, the research community has been investigating
approaches to network resilience for several years. However,
aside from well-established techniques, many of these solutions
have not found their way into operational environments. The
RECODIS COST Action aims to address this shortcoming by
providing solutions that are tailored to specific types of challenge,
whilst considering the wider socio-economic issues that are associ-
ated with their deployment. To support this goal, in this paper, we
present an overview of some of the foundational related work on
network resilience, covering topics such as measuring resilience
and resilient network architectures, amongst others. In addition,
we provide insights into current operational best practices for
ensuring the resilience of carrier-grade communication networks.
The aim of this paper is to support the goals of the EU
COST Action RECODIS and the wider research community in
engineering more resilient communication networks.
Index Terms—resilience, disaster-based disruptions, software
defined networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Disaster-based failures can seriously disrupt a communica-
tion network, making its services unavailable. Such disruptions
may follow from natural disasters, technology-related failures,
or malicious attacks. These disruptions are observably increas-
ing in number, intensity and scale. The problem needs to be
urgently addressed, due to a the lack of suitable mechanisms
deployed in current networks. When network services that are
part of a critical infrastructure become unavailable, commer-
cial and/or societal problems are the inevitable result.
To address this issue, network resilience – the ability of
the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level
of service in the face of various faults and challenges to
normal operation [1] – has received a significant amount of
research attention in recent years. Research has focused on
a wide-range of topics, including measuring the resilience
of networks, multi-level network architectures that facilitate
the engineering of resilient networks, and a multitude of
technologies that address specific challenges, e.g., for wire-
less networks. However, for various reasons, many of these
solutions have yet to see operational deployment.
In response to this, the EU COST Action Resilient com-
munication services protecting end-user applications from
disaster-based failures (RECODIS)1 aims to develop solu-
tions to provide resilient communications in the presence
of disaster-based disruptions of all types for existing and
future communication network architectures. To support their
future operational deployment, this undertaking aims to con-
sider the wider socio-economic environment to which the
solutions will be deployed. The Action has been organised
into working groups that explore solutions to specific types
of challenge – large-scale natural disasters, weather-based
disruptions, technology-related disasters (e.g., blackouts), and
malicious human activities.
As a means of supporting the research that will be under-
taken in RECODIS, and the wider research community, we
present important network resilience principles. The aim is
to provide a normative framework that will support our joint
research activities. In this regard, in order to established a
common understanding about our overall goal, we propose
a definition for communication network resilience. This def-
inition specifies that resilience is a quantifiable measure –
therefore, it is important to establish frameworks for measuring
1http://www.cost.eu/COST Actions/ca/CA15127
network resilience. In Sec IV, we present research findings
on this important topic. In addition, to clearly understand the
nature of the challenges that communication networks face, in
Sec. III, we provide an overview of related work on challenge
taxonomies. A number of solutions for network resilience will
be investigated as part of RECODIS’s activities; in order to
understand how they can be used as part of a larger resilient
network architecture and form a systematic resilience strategy,
architectural principles are presented in Sec. V. Finally, in
Sec. VI, we present best practices for network resilience that
are employed by a large telecoms operator for carrier-grade
networks. The aim is to identify the current state of practice
of operators, including the types of technologies they use and
are considering, that the solutions which will be proposed by
RECODIS must interface with.
II. COMMUNICATION NETWORK RESILIENCE DEFINITION
Beyond the definition for network resilience quoted at the
beginning of this paper (developed as part of the EU FP7 Re-
sumeNet project [2] and ResiliNets initiative [3], and adopted
by ENISA [4]), there are many definitions of resilience. These
range from short ones (e.g., the capacity to recover quickly
from difficulties, as defined in the Oxford dictionary) to quite
long ones. Some definitions consider resilience as an ability,
capacity or property, whereas others consider it as a process.
Some pertain to a particular area or discipline; others take
into account different (multidisciplinary) aspects of it. The
latter approach seems more reasonable to follow, in order to
elaborate one common definition of resilience for use in a
particular domain.
In short, the term resilience – derived from the Latin resalire
– means to spring back. It is used in multiple disciplines,
ranging from psychology to physical sciences and ecology, and
finishing up with engineering, where it relates to the concept
of being able to absorb and recover from hazardous events and
disasters. A very good analysis of the more widely used defini-
tions of resilience, relevant to communities, is provided in [5],
based on five core concepts – attribute, continuing, adaptation,
trajectory, and comparability. That report also points to differ-
ent ways to classify the definitions, e.g., by contrasting “being
vs becoming” or “adaptation vs resistance,” or in terms of
trajectory or predictability, or by taking into consideration the
temporal nature of resilience. Hybrid definitions of resilience
also exist, based on different combinations, e.g., of engineering
with ecology, or ecology with the behavioural science [5]. A
good collection of the ‘best’ ten definitions of resilience (with
respect to ecology and society) can be found in [6]. Some of
those definitions are based on the descriptive concept, whereas
the second group follows the hybrid approach, and the third
group uses the normative concept.
Of course, no perfect definition exists. The same is true for
one commonly accepted definition of resilience that could be
used across all disciplines. The best way, perhaps, is to select
some of the (best) existing definitions with a good applicability
to a particular domain, and try to compile a comprehensive
definition of resilience for that domain. An attempt to do this
for the domain of communication networks was made within
the framework of the EU COST Action RECODIS. As a result,
the following (long) definition was elaborated:
Resilience of a communication network is a quantitative
property of a network that occurs on each level of its hi-
erarchy, and is related to the ability to maintain the same
level of functionality in the face of internal changes and
external disturbances as a result of large-scale natural dis-
asters and corresponding failures, weather-based disruptions,
technology-related disasters, and malicious human activities;
to withstand all these without losing the capacity to allocate
resources efficiently; to maintain acceptable level of service
in the face of various faults, challenges to normal operation,
fluctuating environment, and human use; and to absorb recur-
rent disturbances so as to retain essential infrastructures and
processes, with sufficient cost-efficiency and flexibility over the
long term.
This could be reduced to the following short definition, for
practical use:
Resilience of a communication network is its ability to
maintain the same level of functionality in the face of internal
changes and external disturbances as a result of large-scale
natural disasters and corresponding failures, weather-based
disruptions, technology-related disasters, and malicious hu-
man activities.
An important component of these definitions is the ability
to quantify and measure resilience – we present an overview
of frameworks for measuring resilience in Sec. IV. In addition,
it is important to understand the nature of the challenges,
i.e., internal changes and external disturbances, that could
affect a communications network; we present a taxonomy of
challenges in the following section.
III. TAXONOMIES OF CHALLENGES TO RESILIENCE
End-to-end communications faces a number of challenges
that may result in unsuccessful delivery of information. A
challenge is an adverse event or condition that can cause
deviation of normal network operation [7]. The proper recog-
nition of these network challenges and the corresponding
impact on networks is crucial so that appropriate planning and
measures can take place. We note that, while a taxonomy of
the faults is detailed in IFIP 10.4 group documents [8], the
taxonomy of challenges is the focus of this work. Challenges
are the abnormal events that can trigger the faults and errors,
eventually causing system failure [7]. Network challenges
can be categorized based on a number of criteria including:
cause (natural, human-made, or challenge-dependent), bound-
ary (internal or external), target (direct or collateral), objective
(non-malicious, selfish, or malicious), intent (non-deliberate or
deliberate), capability (accidental or incompetence), dimension
(hardware, software, protocols, or traffic), domain (medium,
mobility, delay, or energy), scope (nodes, links, or area),
significance (minor, major, or catastrophic), persistence (short-
lived, long lived, or transient), as well as repetition (single,
multiple, or adaptive) [7]. A taxonomy of major challenges is











Fig. 1. Taxonomy of major challenges (based on [7], [9])
Large-scale disasters can be result of forces of nature,
including: earthquakes (e.g., the 2006 Taiwan earthquake [10],
the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake [11], the 2011 Japan earth-
quake [12], etc.). Other causes of disaster-based failures
are, e.g., hurricanes (for instance Katrina [13]) responsible
for remarkable disruptions of communication links/hardware
(nodes). Natural disasters also can be associated with cosmo-
logical events (for instance geomagnetic storms [14]). Human-
made disasters can either follow from ignoring early warnings
in the operation of a system or be caused by malicious
activities.
Socio-political & economical challenges refer to deliberate
activities (also acts of terrorism [15]) that are prepared to
disrupt normal operation of a communication network (e.g.,
to achieve advantage on economical markets [16], or as a
response to political decisions [17]).
Dependent failures refer to challenges that may result in a
cascade of failure. Canonical examples include the power grid
and the Internet dependent failures [18]. Another dependent
failure scenario is a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) cascading
failure (e.g., invalid BGP advertisement propagation), in which
BGP routing relies on the correct announcement of these
advertisement messages [19].
Human errors are deliberate or non-deliberate activities. We
can mention here that misconfiguration errors are the result
of human incompetence (which can even lead to catastrophic
failures) [19].
Malicious attacks are with a deliberate intent designed to
cause as much disruption as possible. Such activities are
commonly targeted at important software/hardware elements
of the network [20].
Unusual traffic affects the network traffic, and may cause
the end systems to be unresponsive as in the case of a
flash crowd [21]. Traffic volumes that deviate significantly
from the normal expected traffic can be a problem, if the
capacity of the network resources are not provisioned to
handle the overload traffic. Unusual traffic can occur after
the occurrence of a catastrophic event (e.g., news web servers
became overwhelmed after the 9/11 terror attacks [22]). Such
an event does not necessarily disrupt the network infrastructure
itself, but may result in a significant increase in the number


























Fig. 2. The ANSA dependability framework
Environmental challenges are greatly influenced by char-
acteristics of the communication environment (e.g., mobility,
delay issues in wireless networks [23]).
Any challenge can also be characterized based on its spatial
region and time duration. The spatial and temporal features of
a challenge might be different, including its spatial and tem-
poral impact [7]. For instance, concerning spatial region, an
attack being a challenge related to a single node may influence
the performance of the entire network. Similarly, time duration
of, e.g., an earthquake (seconds) differs significantly from the
duration of impact (here in days).
Finally, we note that as new challenges are explored, this
taxonomy can be adapted to include new aspects. The investi-
gation of challenges in emerging technologies (e.g., Software-
defined Networks (SDNs), Network Functions Virtualization
(NFV), and Cloud) is a research direction to understand and
develop mechanisms against challenges [24].
IV. MEASURING NETWORK RESILIENCE
There have been a number of frameworks proposed for
measuring resilience, survivability, and dependability. Depend-
ability [25] measures, such as reliability (the probability that
a system will remain operational for a specified period of
time) and availability (the probability that a system is up at
a particular point in time), as well as performability [26] that
measures the degraded performance of a complex system such
as the Internet, can be used to characterize the resilience (and
survivability of communication networks.
ANSA [27] was a distributed systems project that included
a dependability framework, as shown in Fig. 2. Occurrences
of value tuples (with only 1 value dimension shown here) are
measured over time. Expectations can include a value at a
given time, a value over time e1, a range of values over time e2,
and a range of values that changes over time e3. Occurrences
are measured with expectations; correct operations consists of
occurrences corresponding within time and value of expecta-
tions (o1, o2, o3). Failures are measured when occurrences do
not meet expectations, for example ou.
A couple of notable frameworks to measure survivability
against correlated failures include a state-based approach [28],
in which various events move the system between operational
states, and a two-dimensional Markov chain [29], in which





























































Fig. 4. T1A1 and ResiliNets temporal metrics
and the other dimension measures conventional arrivals and
service.
ResiliNets uses a two-dimensional state space to measure
resilience, as shown in Fig. 3 [30], [31]. The horizontal axis
measures an objective function of the network operational
state; a resilient infrastructure maintains normal operation
in the face of challenges. The vertical axis is an objective
function of service metrics; a resilient service remains ac-
ceptable even when the network degrades. The ResiliNets
D2R2+DR (Defend, Detect, Remediate, Recover + Diagnose,
Refine) resilience strategy [1] is overlaid. As long as the
system remains in normal operation with acceptable service
S0, defences have held. If either network or service monitoring
detects a deviation to a challenged state Sc, remediation mech-
anisms are invoked, driving to a better state Sr. Eventually,
when infrastructure has been repaired or replaced, the system
can recover to its original state. Resilience is measured as
1− (area under state trajectory). The smaller the area, the
higher the resilience, either because the triangle is narrow
(infrastructure resilience) or shallow (service resilience). After
diagnosis and refinement evolves the network and improves
D2R2, the loop will be tighter giving a smaller area and better
resilience.
ANSI/ATIS T1 has modelled service outages as a triple
(U,D,E) [32] where U is unservability, D is duration,







Fig. 5. The ANSI/ATIS T1 service outages model [32]
Fig. 6. Midwest US power blackout model
catastrophic based on the magnitude, as shown in Fig. 5. A
large-scale disaster would be catastrophic in this classification,
and have a large surface when plotted in three dimensions of
(U,D,E). Furthermore, a temporal view (based on [32] with
D2R2+DR overlaid is shown in Fig. 4. In normal operation,
performability P (t) is one. A challenge reduces peformability
by Pu to Pa. After detection and remediation tr, performability
is increased by Pr. Eventually, as infrastructure is repaired and
replaced after tR, performability returns to 1.
To understand the effect of large scale disasters [31] as
well as to facilitate identification of critical region vulnera-
bility [33], ResiliNets uses an ns-3 simulation-based method-
ology, as well as graph-theoretic and optimisations to model
various challenges. These can be circular (as would be the
case for CME – solar coronal mass ejections and EMP –
electromagnetic pulse weapons), polygonal (as would be the
case for power blackouts as exemplified in Fig. 6), and may
move (as would be the case for hurricanes and typhoons).
An arbitrary challenge can be applied to any real or
proposed network topology, which can then be modelled to
understand the impact. This is a multilevel model, in which
the physical infrastructure failures are propagated up to the
network topology level, propagated up to the routing level,
propagate up to the end-to-end transport level, and finally
up to the application level [34]. Building on such multi-level
resilience metrics, an analysis can be carried out that assess the
resilience of a network across different layers. This analysis
for instance helps to highlight structural vulnerabilities. In
the design phase of a network they can be used to evaluate
alternative architectures or configurations. For instance, using
metrics such as topology diversity and connectivity, path
routing diversity and connectivity, etc. can be analysed to
demonstrate the effect failures of individual components or
links have on the overall network resilience.
How this can be used in practice to assess the structural re-
silience of a specific network is demonstrated in [30], [1] using
the GEANT2 topology. This analysis also shows what impact
a power-grid failures on the resilience of an ISP topology at
different levels can have. In order to measure resilience a two
dimensional state space is used in which resilience is expressed
in a range from (0,1) where 0 is representing no resilience,
and 1 is representing infinite resilience. The two dimensions
according to which the resilience is assessed are operational
state (ranging from normal to severely degraded) and service
parameters (ranging from acceptable to unacceptable). Each
of the dimensions is associated with objective functions that
allow to measure resilience. A challenge can cause a change in
the resilience state that is then measurable in a degraded of the
overall resilience value. In the context of multi-level resilience
the service parameters at the layer boundary becomes the
operational metric of the layer above, i.e. the impact of a
resilience challenge at one level is reflected in the degraded
operational state provided to the service user.
A formal multi-level graph model and framework for multi-
level graph evaluation is developed in [34], which is used to
analyse the resiliency of single and multi-level graphs, using
the flow robustness metric (the fraction of node pairs that
remain connected after a number of removals [35]). Then
C¸etinkaya et al. [34] define the concept of multi-provider graph
to represent the inter-provider AS (autonomous system) topol-
ogy, and analyse the flow robustness in three different multi-
provider graphs under different types of challenges (random
and targeted).
Another example is presented in [36], where the robust-
ness of a network is being analysed by considering multiple
network levels using a graph theoretical approach. A compu-
tational framework for network resilient is being developed
through which the impact of challenges can be assessed. In
order to do so the network topology is captured in form of a
graph and then assessed using a graph explorer approach con-
sidering multi-level network metrics. With this approach the
entire state space of a communication system is analysed and
a risk map can be developed. This risk map captures different
system levels by, for instance, looking at how application level
performance is affected through specific challenges to various
network components.
V. ARCHITECTURAL CONCERNS FOR RESILIENCE
In computer networks, resilience is an infrastructure and
management property. Therefore, network architectures have,
on the one hand, to display a certain degree of structural
resilience that enables them to withstand and compensate
for any potential malfunction in the case of attacks, outages
or other challenges. On the other hand, future network ar-
chitectures also have to have active resilience management
components that enable autonomic detection and protective
actions, once challenges have been identified. Hence, the
resilience of networks has to be ensured at the structural and
the operational level.
At a structural level, resilience is achieved through means
such as replication and diversity, which can be implemented
in a complementary manner at different system levels. For
instance, at the network layer, a number of alternative routes
exist through which packets can be forwarded, and (ideally)
routers and equipment will be from different vendors running
alternative implementations of routing protocols. This strategy
allows a network or system, in the event of failures, to utilise
alternative resources in order to maintain the service.
Meanwhile, at the operational level, resilience is achieved
through active detection, remediation and recovery actions
(see the ResiliNets D2R2 + DR resilience strategy [1]).
Anomaly detection can be performed throughout the system
at the application layer, edge network as well as in the
network core itself. Appropriate remediation strategies then
help to ensure continued operation, even during situations
where there are challenges. Thus, a network architecture that
is designed according to resilience principles has to provide
both – structural and operational resilience.
In keeping with the traditional separation of concerns (as
expressed through layering principles) network resilience ar-
chitectures also have to consider structural and operational
resilience across the different communication layers. It is
recognized that cross-layer analysis and information flows are
required, in order to ensure the effectiveness of resilience
operation. The provisions of so-called Multi-Level Resilience
(MLR) as a property of network architectures has two main
aspects: Structural Multi-Level Resilience (SMLR), as mainly
expressed through frameworks and architectural models and
the assessment of the resilience level they offer (e.g., [30]), and
Operational Multi-Level Resilience (OMLR), i.e., providing
coordinated resilience mechanism across system layers and
even system boundaries.
It is important to note that a resilient network architecture is
based on the concept of autonomic components that have large
degrees of self-organisation. These autonomic components
are not only adaptable to the environment, but can also
evolve. Collaboration between them largely happens through
information exchange and the adoption of joint policies and
rule sets.
A. Structural Network Resilience
In order to deal with challenges in a more systematic
manner, a number of resilience principles have been defined
as part of a resilience framework [1]. These principles help to
systematically address the different areas and concepts that are
related to the resilience domain, considering the prerequisites,
trade-offs, enablers and behaviour. An overview of these
principles for resilience are presented in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. An overview of the ResiliNets resilience principles [1]
Regarding the key enablers, redundancy refers to the repli-
cation of components, i.e., hardware (such as switches and
routers), as well as communication links (e.g., the availability
of multiple alternative paths between source and destination).
The general idea is that redundant components can pick up
tasks of a failing entity. This principle can be applied at
all layers of the communication stack. Diversity, in addition
to redundancy, helps to avoid challenges of the same kind
affecting (homogeneous) system components in the same way.
For instance, hardware components from different suppliers
are less likely to suffer the same faults, or software that is
developed by different software engineers should also not
contain the same programming errors. Hence, diversity helps
to improve resilience, if the diverse components provide
an equivalent level of service, while being structurally and
operationally different. Connectivity and association refer to
the continued ability for information exchange between system
entities, even in the case of disruptions.
More specifically, for example, in [37], [38] the Spine
concept is introduced as a subnetwork structure that is em-
bedded at the physical layer with higher availability. The
spine concept allows the creation of heterogeneous availability
subnetworks at the physical layer, laying the foundation for
service differentiation at upper layers. In [39] it is used to pro-
vide differentiated services over multilayer communications
networks. Multiple logical networks with diverse availability
levels are defined via a cross-layer mapping. Results in [39]
showed the proposed model can create a wider range of
availability levels compared to existing techniques, although
in some cases the spine requires slightly more resources.
B. Operational Network Resilience Support
At the operational level, resilience has to be provided in
conjunction with network management functions. There are
two main elements that need to be part of this resilience
management process – challenge detection and remediation
(alongside recovery). For the first task, network state is as-
sessed by anomaly detection components that are distributed
throughout an interconnected network infrastructure. Detection
components can sit alongside the routing infrastructure or be
part of it.
In addition to the coordinated detection of challenges, other
aspects of resilience have to be carried out in a coordinated
manner throughout the interconnected network infrastructure.
To realise this, an approach that makes use of policies, in
conjunction with remediation mechanisms that can be progres-
Fig. 8. A multi-stage approach to network resilience [40]
sively refined, has been proposed [41], [42]. The idea is that
an initial indication of an anomaly triggers a staged network
management and resilience process, in which the diagnosis is
refined in order to gain more certainty about the challenge.
Based on this, remedial actions are also refined, in order to
become more targeted. This concept is depicted in Fig. 8.
For instance, during the onset of a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack, the first indication will be an increase
in traffic on a specific network link. Once a certain threshold
has been reached, remediation actions have to be taken in order
to protect the network resources. At this stage, the cause of
the anomaly might not be clear and hence further analysis
helps to establish the exact cause (e.g., a DDoS attack or
flash crowd), and also to instantiate at each stage appropriate
countermeasures (ranging from initial rate limiting the link to
selectively dropping of packets from offending sources). How
this scheme can be realised in the context of Software-defined
Networks (SDN) is shown in [43], using a policy pattern based
control and management scheme.
VI. NETWORK RESILIENCE: OPERATOR BEST PRACTICES
In this section, we present current best practices for re-
silience in carrier networks. The aim of the EU COST Action
RECODIS is to be enhance these capabilities, in order to
improve the resilience of such networks (and others) to large-
scale disasters. In general, today’s operated optical transport
networks provide unprotected or protected services from 1
Gbit/s up to 100 Gbit/s to destinations across the world2.
When we refer to protected services, resilience usually
follows a 1+1 dedicated path or link protection over topolog-
ically disjoint parts of the network. Failure impact is quasi-
instantaneously remediated. The reaction can be carried out
directly on the data plane, without involvement of the control
plane. Typically, protection-based reactions are preconfigured
in order to allow for a fast failover, typically within the 50
milliseconds range.
The restoration process, in contrast, takes a comparably long
time. Indeed, the recovery mechanism itself starts immediately
after failure detection. However, the process might include
communication with a controller instance. This controller re-
computes the best lightpath guidance through the network.
Traffic engineering and optimization routines might decide
on modifications of existing end-to-end paths. Furthermore,
2See Deutsche Telekom’s international carriers’ carrier DWDM network as
an example: http://www.telekom-icss.com/lambdaconnect
Fig. 9. Deutsche Telekom’s international high-quality DWDM network
the controller defines the sequential recovery order of all
affected lightpaths. Accordingly, each path is signaled from
the source to the destination node, and then the bandwidth
is re-provisioned to fulfil the given service level agreements.
Usually, there is no accurate or obligatory time limit for such
a recovery mechanism, besides that it needs to be done as fast
as possible.
A. Multi-layer Resilience with a Flexible Optical Layer
In a multi-layer framework, recovery needs to be ac-
complished on multiple involved layers. The most relevant
work [44], [45] exclusively targets two layers – the optical
and the IP packet layer – which have to react to a failure in a
coordinated way.
At the optical layer, today’s long-haul 100Gbit/s transceivers
usually operate with Dual-Polarization Quaternary Phase-Shift
Keying (DP-QPSK) modulation, and have a reach limitation
of about 2500km. This is long enough for most applications
in national European core networks and enables even a trans-
parent backup lightpath connection. Recent progress in optics
and electronics has enabled a significant increase in symbol
rates and modulation technology. Therefore, near-future high-
speed transceivers can also operate at DP-M-QAM formats.
Such a flexrate transceiver is reported which supports net bit
rates from 100 to 400Gbit/s in steps of 25Gbit/s and generates
modulation formats from DP-QPSK to DP-64QAM [46].
Flexrate transceivers offer many advantages, such as less stock
holding costs and improved network usability.
However, this comes along with a fundamentally reduced
transmission reach. In case of a cost-efficient optical restora-
tion solution, the recovered lightpath length usually exceeds
the original reach which might overburden the previous set-
tings of the flexrate transceivers at both sides of the lightpath.
Then, a transport network operator has two options: either
to shut-down the optical link entirely or to squeeze out the
capabilities of affected transceivers in the best possible way,
i.e., to reduce their transport capacity down to a value that is
applicable for the restored link conditions.
This best-effort optical capacity poses new questions from
the packet layer perspective. Traditional IP/MPLS networks
Fig. 10. A high-level view of a hierarchical SDN control architecture,
including the main components
rely on fixed capacities provided from the optical layer. IP
networks prefer an entire interface shut-down with no capacity
to a partial recovered capacity. Existing load balancing mecha-
nisms such as Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) are not capacity
aware, i.e., they split the IP traffic load onto all involved
interfaces likewise. As ECMP with unequal optical capacities
may lead to a degradation of the Quality of Service, operators
prefer to switch off a partially recovered capacity. Of course,
from an overall network perspective this is counterproductive.
B. Resilience Management with Software-defined Networks
Motivated by this shortcoming, a new SDN-based solution
was investigated in [45] for controlling the routers such that
volatile interface capacities can still be utilized and the overall
multi-layer network cost can be reduced.
The control architecture is depicted in Fig. 10. Here, the
logically centralized SDN orchestrator communicates through
an OpenFlow interface directly with the Label Edge Routers
(LER). This way, it monitors the traffic flows as well as the
overall network state with respect to the different internal
routing protocols. Furthermore, it reads the optical network
topology from the optical controller. When no failure exists
in the network, the SDN orchestrator is passive and does not
interfere with the routing decision of the IP/MPLS layer.
When an optical link has failed and is already restored,
its potentially reduced capacity is signaled by the optical
controller to the SDN orchestrator. Using this information as
well as the state of the core network, the orchestrator is able
to calculate globally optimized multi-layer decisions. It might
selectively override the routing decisions made by the MPLS
layer to account for the capacity reduction of the recovered
optical connections.
Figure 11 shows a small sample network for illustration. The
operation principle is visualized by an OpenFlow rule, though
in real deployments orchestration might be based by any
other appropriate protocol, such as Netconf/YANG, Restconf
Fig. 11. Symmetric load balancing (done by, e.g., ECMP) in case of normal
network operation
Fig. 12. Asymmetric load balancing in case of a network failure
and YANG or REST. The ECMP mechanism distributes the
500Gbit/s outgoing traffic of LSR 51 evenly on its three
outgoing 200Gbit/s links to LSR 52, 53, and 54.
Due to a link failure, the bandwidth on the link between
LSR 51 and 52 is assumed be reduced to 100Gbit/s. The
bottleneck is detected by the SDN orchestrator and a new path
is calculated, see Fig. 12. The OpenFlow group of type select
is extended to three buckets, one for each outgoing link on
LSR 51. Those type select OpenFlow groups assign matching
packets to one of the buckets by hashing selected header fields.
Each bucket applies a node label stack to passing packets that
forces them through a different outgoing link of LSR 51. By
assigning appropriate weight values to all buckets, traffic can
be distributed just matching the remaining optical capacities.
After this procedure is applied on each of the selected flows,
the network is back in a balanced state and the SDN orches-
trator signals that the optical links should be activated again.
The packet layer restoration is completed. When the optical
link has been repaired, the updated link capacity is signaled to
the SDN orchestrator, which in turn removes the redirection
rules. At this point in time, the network is reverted back to the
operation mode and is controlled by the proven MPLS protocol
again. This resiliency solution overcomes the limitations of
current ECMP-based mechanisms by an asymmetric multipath
routing, enabled by a customized OpenFlow-based Segment
Routing approach. No further network equipment renewal
is required, except an appropriate software interface and its
implementation under an SDN orchestration environment is
needed.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The resilience of communication networks to disasters is of
the highest societal and economic importance. This is becom-
ing increasingly the case as Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) play a more central role in the operation
of our critical infrastructures, such as transportation and power
systems. The international research community has investi-
gated a wide variety of approaches to improving network
resilience. However, a significant amount of this research has
not made it into operational environments. There are various
reasons for this, but perhaps a major factor relates to a lack
of consideration of the broader socio-economic context that
solutions are being placed into. Specifically, there is a trade-off
that needs to be made with regard to potential improvements
in resilience (to black swan events) and the cost of imple-
mentation of solutions, such as technologies, organisational
processes, and (regulatory) frameworks. The RECODIS COST
Action aims to propose solutions to this problem, focusing
on the resilience of communication networks to large-scale
disasters, such as earthquakes and cyber-attacks.
In this paper, we have presented a number of principles of
resilience, which can inform the ongoing research in the wider
community and, more specifically, the activities of the Action.
In the first instance, it is necessary to come to a common
understanding about what we, as a community, mean when we
talk about resilience for communication networks. After all,
this is our goal, which should be clearly defined. The subject
of resilience has been studied in a number of disciplines,
including biology and economics. We draw inspiration from
these works to define, in Sec. II, a longer and shorter-form
definition of resilience. There are two important aspects of
these definitions: (i) an explicit mention is made of cost-
effectiveness; and (ii) we highlight the need for resilience
to be quantifiable. Throughout the course of the Action, we
will return to this definition, for example, to examine its
relationship to related concepts such as sustainability.
An important aspect of resilience is preparedness – this is
embodied in the “Defend” stage of the D2R2+DR resilience
strategy. To be prepared, one has to have an understanding of
the nature of the challenges that need to be addressed. To this
end, we present an overview of related work on taxonomies
of challenges to communication networks. It can be seen from
this presentation that challenges to communication networks
are wide-ranging, e.g., from terrorist attacks through to torna-
does. Therefore, it is important to analyse the risks associated
with challenges, in a given context; a topic that we do not
cover in this paper. With an understanding of risk, it is then
possible for an operator to prioritise the implementation of
resilience measures. Arguably, the presented taxonomies do
not pay sufficient attention to the “internal changes” – a form
of challenge – that are mentioned in our resilience definition.
In particular, organisational changes, which have significant
impact on resilience, are not well-explored. This could be an
area for further consideration.
As mentioned earlier, resilience should be measurable –
without the capacity to measure how resilient a communication
infrastructure is, it is not possible to determine the effective-
ness of a given set of resilience solutions. Here, we present
an overview of related work that has proposed approaches
to measuring the resilience of communication networks. An
interesting aspect of these approaches is how they consider
(model) the interdependency of resilience measures at different
layers (e.g., physical and network layers). As communication
networks increasingly support future cyber-physical systems,
e.g., the smart grid, it could be of value to develop frameworks
for identifying and measuring similar dependencies between
properties in the cyber (network) and physical domains.
To systematically engineer resilient communication net-
works – and go beyond the development of point solutions
for specific challenges – it is important to make use of
architectural principles. Here, we have presented related work
on two main forms of architectural resilience that should be
considered: structural and operational. Structural resilience is
concerned with techniques such as redundancy and diversity
of components, whereas operational aspects consider resilience
management functions that coordinate end-to-end and multi-
level resilience mechanisms. A combination of both is required
– a key research question relates to determining when should
one approach be taken over another, and how do operational
resilience approaches interface with the organisations and
individuals that operate them (i.e., questioning the role of the
human on the loop).
Finally, we have presented best practices for network re-
silience that are being employed by a major telecoms oper-
ator, and the applied research direction they are taking with
respect to how resilience can be improved with the use of
software-defined networks. A goal of the EU COST Action
RECODIS is to examine approaches such as these, considering
their suitability to mitigate large-scale disasters, and propose
solutions that can improve the overall resilience provided by
communication networks to end-users.
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